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Professor Michael Perry's new book, Morality, Politics, and Law, is an
ambitious attempt to address the extent to which moral and religious be-
liefs in a pluralistic society, such as ours, can legitimately influence law.
He departs from the common opinion in legal circles that moral beliefs
are a matter of taste or "values," and defends an older conception that it is
possible to attain moral "knowledge." ' He also departs from the "liberal
political-philosophical project," 2 which claims that it is possible (and de-
sirable) for governments to steer a neutral course between competing
moral understandings of the good. This, he suggests, is an illusion, and a
disguise for the imposition of a particular moral structure without oppor-
tunity for open deliberation and reflection.
Professor Perry brings some refreshing common sense to these riddles of
moral philosophy. His "naturalist" approach has obvious roots in Aris-
totle-not a bad place to begin thinking about ethics. His dismissal of
* Stanford Clinton Senior Research Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
f Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to Albert Al-
schuler, Douglas Baird, Richard Epstein, Larry Kramer, Richard Posner, Daniel Ritchie, Cass Sun-
stein, and Adam Wolfson for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
1. M. PERRY, MORALrrY, POLITIcS, & LAW 28 (1988) [hereinafter referred to by page only].
2. P. 57.
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moral skepticism and his respectful dissection of moral relativism, while
not precisely original, are cogent and provocative. His insistence that
moral principles are rooted in the experience of actual moral communities
over time (religious communities among them) is a welcome antidote to
modern rationalism, which has left its adherents defenseless against decon-
struction and, ultimately, nihilism. Although professional philosophers
would no doubt find much to criticize in his often summary disposition of
perennial questions of ethics and epistemology, he presents his insights in
a form that is interesting and challenging to those primarily concerned
about questions of constitutional interpretation.
Perry couples his observations about moral philosophy with a plea for a
new kind of politics-"a deliberative, transformative politics-as distinct
from a politics that is merely manipulative and self-serving."' It turns out
that this kind of politics does not take place chiefly in legislative halls or
on the electoral hustings, but in courtrooms. It turns out, also, that this
kind of judicial politics requires a particular kind of interpretation, one all
too familiar to devotees of modern constitutional theory. The task is to
liberate judges from the constraints of a constitution seen as a settled body
of principles. Thus, while his moral philosophy sets Perry apart from the
prevailing opinion in legal academia, his constitutional theory does not.
Despite its familiar elements, however, Professor Perry's argument for
"nonoriginalist" judicial review has a distinctive character. Most argu-
ments about "originalism" and "nonoriginalism"4 consist of attacks on the
former: that originalism is incoherent, based on historical error, or mor-
ally derelict. Much of this criticism can itself be criticized for being more
detailed, exacting, and censorious about the positions attacked than about
the (often rather hazy) alternatives proposed. Morality, Politics, and Law
departs from this model. In it, Perry responds to "the soundest-most
attractive, least vulnerable-version of originalism I can imagine."' 5 He
goes so far as to defend originalism against a few of the most common
arguments made by such scholars as Ronald Dworkin, Sanford Levinson,
Mark Tushnet, and Robert Bennett. His presentation of the originalist
position-while not the most attractive I can imagine-is fair-minded and
respectful. His argument is not based on the defects of originalism, but on
the superior quality of his own theory. "Originalism's weaknesses," he
says, "are not intrinsic, but comparative: Originalism lacks the strengths
of the nonoriginalist theory of judicial role I elaborate and defend." 6
In that spirit I will take up Professor Perry's argument, beginning, as
he begins, with the question of moral knowledge. This requires an exami-
3. P. 4.
4. Like Perry, pp. 279-80 n.7, I have misgivings about the terms "originalism" and "nonoriginal-
ism," but will use them in this review in the way I understand him to be using them.
5. P. 122.
6. P. 131.
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nation of how moral reasoning takes place. Part I is a discussion of
Perry's uneasy attempt to wed critical rationality to moral (including reli-
gious) tradition. The role of moral and religious communities leads to a
discussion in Part II of the ways in which religious communities interpret
their sacred texts, and of Perry's analogy to judicial interpretation of the
constitutional text. In these two sections my focus is largely methodologi-
cal, and I follow Perry's order of argument.
In the remainder of the essay, I attempt to apply Perry's approach (ap-
propriately modified) to the liberal, democratic, and law-governed tradi-
tions of the American polity, which I believe he is prone to undervalue. In
Parts III and IV, I explore the principles of equality and individual
rights, highlighting the contrast between Perry's approach and the "self-
evident" truths of the Declaration of Independence. In Parts V, VI, and
VII, I discuss Perry's ambivalent posture toward the principle of govern-
ment by consent, which manifests itself in a preference for judicial over
representative decisionmaking on matters of moral consequence. In Part
VIII, I conclude with a brief discussion of why Perry's reformulation of
the judicial function might weaken the vital democratic link between
moral convictions and law.
I. ON TRADITION AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE
The moral question, according to Professor Perry, echoing the ancients,
is how to live. His "naturalist" approach to moral philosophy is to reason
about how to live so as to "flourish"-to live the most deeply satisfying
life of which one is capable.' Reasoning about how to "flourish" involves
reasoning from certain core convictions (usually relatively concrete) to the
issue at hand. This process, as described by Perry, is neither individualis-
tic nor rationalistic. "Basic moral beliefs," he says, "are less the property
of individuals than of communities." 8 And while moral reasoning must be
self-critical and rational, its constitutive elements are the traditions of the
moral communities in which the moral actor participates. "[T]he criterion
for the revision of self is self, and the criterion for the revision of tradition
is tradition. There is no escaping self or tradition: There is no evaluative
perspective outside self or tradition."9 One of the most distinctive and at-
tractive features of Perry's account is that he accords full respect and rec-
ognition to religious communities and religious traditions, which, he be-
lieves, have full and equal rights to participate as such in political
decisionmaking-to speak in their own terms and to promote their own
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communities,1" and criticizes "secular leftists" for their "reductionist atti-
tudes," which keep them from exploring "the resources of the great reli-
gious traditions" for "thinking about the human."11
Thus far, Perry's naturalist moral philosophy may seem to have more
in common with the conservatism of an Edmund Burke or the Bible Belt
than with the various strains of individualism, rationalism, and secularism
that make up modern American liberalism. If Burke could be summoned
from the grave, he would surely agree with Perry that "[t]he ambition of
liberal political philosophy notwithstanding, moral discourse must rely on
relatively particular moral beliefs that, for the present at least, have with-
stood the test of experience, especially the experience of a moral commu-
nity (or communities) over time."" As Burke understood, 3 if moral dis-
course is grounded in this form of experience, we are less likely to stumble
into the totalitarian horrors of a political system predicated on an abstract
and unreal vision of the nature of humankind.
One shortcoming of Perry's account is that he neglects to discuss the
reasons why thoughtful individuals often defer to tradition and historical
experience when making moral judgments, rather than attempt a more
individualistic or utopian analysis. Such deference is natural and inevita-
ble, as Perry indicates, but it is also sensible. An individual has only his
own, necessarily limited, intelligence and experience (personal and vicari-
ous) to draw upon. Tradition, by contrast, is composed of the cumulative
thoughts and experiences of thousands of individuals over an expanse of
time, each of them making incremental and experimental alterations
(often unconsciously), which are then adopted or rejected (again, often
unconsciously) on the basis of experience-the experience, that is, of
whether they advance the good life. Much as a market is superior to cen-
tral planning for efficient operation of an economy,14 a tradition is supe-
rior to seemingly more "rational" modes of decisionmaking for attainment
of moral knowledge.
This is true for individuals, but it is even more true for societies. Indi-
viduals sometimes "beat the market" (thereby adding information to the
market) and individuals sometimes become saints and martyrs (thereby
adding to the tradition). But economies directed by a central planning of-
10. He is more explicit about the role of religious arguments in politics in Perry, Comment on
"The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Envi-
ronment," 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067, 1070-72 (1986).
11. P. 183.
12. P. 36.
13. See generally E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.M. Dent & Sons
ed. 1910).
14. Despite obvious flaws in many actual markets, a virtual consensus has emerged, across the
ideological spectrum, that markets (where they are possible) are more efficient than central planning,
leading to higher productivity and growth. The emerging tendency on the left is to rely on markets for
economic organization and to engage in redistribution and selective intervention to accomplish other
goals.
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fice are always inefficient and societies directed by a central moral author-
ity tend toward blindness and tyranny. Communities of free, spontane-
ously interacting persons are superior to both individualistic and
hierarchical systems of designed order.15
But Perry recognizes, as many have not, the revolutionary potential of a
deep commitment to a recorded tradition. A recorded tradition gives indi-
viduals and communities access to a vantage point distinct from-and po-
tentially in opposition to-the prevailing judgment of today, of what reli-
gious persons typically call "the world."" Far from being the "dead hand
of the past," tradition can be liberating because it frees us from the tyr-
anny of the present. Thus we arrive at the paradox of conservatism: that
allegiance to the memory of an idealized past, with its idealized principles,
has historically been the leading impetus to constructive social (as well as
individual) transformation. 11
Yet Professor Perry has not fully absorbed the wisdom of his own mes-
sage. He takes pains to dissociate himself from the "conservative" point
readers might otherwise draw from his discussion of tradition.18 He insists
that "an important condition of the 'health'-the flourishing-of persons
and therefore of traditions is that they have the capacities for self-critical
rationality and for growth." 9 Indeed, it is necessary for a community to
"maintain a critical attitude towards the tradition."20 "A religious tradi-
tion has ceased to live when, inter alia, the community that is its present
bearer is no longer sensitive to the need to criticize and revise the commu-
nity's form of life in the light of new experience and exigencies."'" He
thus singles out for praise the "critical efforts of feminist Christian theolo-
15. The leading theorist of spontaneous order is Friedrich A. von Hayek, whose THE FATAL
CONCEIT (1988), 1 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1973), and STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLI-
TICS AND ECONOMICS (1967) are most pertinent here. An early statement of this position can be
found in D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. I (L.A. Selby-Bigge 2d ed. 1978)
(1739-40).
16. For a particularly thoughtful discussion of the relation between religion and the world, see
H.R. NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951).
17. See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 35-36 (1963) ("revolution" originally meant "movement
of revolving back to some pre-established point and, by implication, of swinging back into a pre-
ordained order"- "restoration"); M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 4-5
(1987) ("The claim to have found again some long-lost or corrupted doctrine is the basis of every
religious and moral reformation."). For dozens of examples of the transformative impact of tradition
in English history, see P. JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE (1987). Johnson
comments:
The concept of an ancient and perfect legal framework is, of course, an illusion. Such a thing
has never existed, could never exist. But the English conviction that it does and must exist is so
strong that any approach to change must be made from a conservative standpoint. It must be
introduced under the guise of putting the clock back to an imaginary period in which the law
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gians, like Rosemary Ruether, to uncover the patriarchal aspects of their
tradition and to establish . . . the 'sinful' (alienated and alienating) char-
acter of those aspects,""2 while referring disparagingly to the efforts of
"the Polish Pope and many of his bureaucratic staff, most of whom are
European," for seeking to restrain the tides of change in the American
Catholic Church.23
Professor Perry is trying to have his tradition and eat it too. An excess
of "self-critical rationality" is death to tradition." Is it rational for Jew-
ish boys and men to wear little black caps on their heads or for Amish to
dress like 17th Century German peasants? Is it rational for pro-life
Catholics to go to jail to save a few babies from abortion or for Hindus to
refuse to eat beef? What does Perry make of Tertullian's famous remark,
"credo quia absurdam" ("I believe because it is absurd")? What will be
left of tradition after we excise all the beliefs and practices that flunk the
test of self-critical rationality? It is not even clear that posing the question
("Is it rational. . . ?") makes sense for a belief system in which faith,
piety, charisma, love, esthetics, mystery, or wonder plays the central role.
St. Paul warned against allowing human wisdom to be dominant over
religious faith:
For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to
us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written, "I
will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of the clever I
will thwart." Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is
the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the
world?25
Ironically, an excess of self-critical rationality neutralizes the revolu-
tionary potential of tradition. In practice, it means that we will seek to
bring the tradition (including its idealized principles) into conformity with
what seems more "reasonable" to our modern minds-namely, the norms
of modern culture, particularly its more elite expression. If we maintain a
"critical attitude towards the tradition," we are no longer able to use the
tradition to foster a critical attitude toward "the world."
Perry's insistence on self-critical rationality contradicts his own position
that "[t]here is no evaluative perspective outside self or tradition."26 To
say that the "health" of a tradition should be judged by its "capacit[y] for
self-critical rationality and for growth"2 is obviously to apply a standard
22. P. 139.
23. P. 30.
24. The corrosive effects of modem rationalism are vividly described in Michael Oakeshott's clas-
sic essay, Rationalism in Politics, in M. OAKSHorr, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER Es-
SAYS (1962).
25. 1 Cor. 1:18-20 (RSV) (quoting Is. 29:14).
26. P. 31.
27. P. 31.
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of judgment independent of the tradition. It is to give a privileged position
to the post-Enlightenment western secular tradition.
To be wary of "self-critical rationality" is not, however, to reject the
role of reason within a moral or religious tradition. There are different
styles of reason, appropriate to different purposes. The style of reason
characteristically employed within a moral-religious tradition is quite un-
like the self-critical rationality that Perry insists upon. The sign of a
faithful participant in a tradition is that he is engaged, seriously and con-
scientiously, in learning what the tradition has to offer. He need not be
blind to the defects in the tradition, but he will approach the tradition
with a receptive and respectful-even pious-attitude. At its best, this en-
tails powerful and creative exercises of the faculty of reason, but it is not
the same as self-critical rationality. The distinction is between reason that
seeks to understand the wisdom of the tradition and reason that seeks to
expose its faults.
The difference between the critical and the receptive styles of reason
helps explain the paradox of conservatism, the connection between tradi-
tion and reformation. The virtue of piety inclines us to regard our fore-
bears in the tradition as good, wise, and just (probably better, wiser, and
more just than they were in fact). This will incline us, in seeking to un-
derstand the tradition, to emphasize those elements in the tradition that
are most worthy of praise. We like to contemplate the American founders'
heroic sacrifices for liberty; we do not like to dwell upon their institution
of slavery. Thus, we interpret their legacy, piously and not critically, as
embodying the spirit of liberty; we deem the institution of slavery, with its
still-lingering shadows, to be out of keeping with the tradition. Piety is
therefore the engine of reform, as faithful participants in the tradition ever
strive to make it more worthy of an idealized past.
The great example in American history is Abraham Lincoln's interpre-
tation of the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln, refusing to believe
that our forefathers were hypocrites, understood the invocation of equality
in the Declaration as a "standard maxim for free society, which could be
familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored
for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated."2
He was therefore able to oppose slavery on the ground that it was incon-
sistent with the fundamentals of the American system. Many abolitionists,
adopting a "critical" attitude toward the tradition, denounced the Consti-
tution with its protections for slavery as "a covenant with death and an
agreement with hell."2 They thus cut themselves off from great reservoirs
28. R. BASLER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 361 (1946).
29. Resolution Adopted by the Anti-Slavery Society (Jan. 27, 1843) (drafted by William Lloyd
Garrison), quoted in P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND
EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 3 (1975).
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of popular understanding and support, as well as sources of wisdom about
political right.
Perhaps the greatest recent example is the Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr., who repeatedly invoked the principles of the American tradition
in support of the civil rights struggle. King's message carried so much
moral force (even among whites and even in the South) precisely because
it drew faithfully upon the (unfulfilled) tradition of the American political
community. His "dream" of a more just America was less a condemnation
of the nation than a call for its "return" to the principles announced, but
never fully followed, by the Founders.
Moral reasoning by the pious adherent may end up transforming the
tradition, sometimes convulsively, in the belief that a "return" to original
principles is vital. Martin Luther loved the authentic tradition of his
Church and venerated the apostles. His piety sundered that Church. But
the person who is self-consciously committed to criticizing the tradition on
the basis of "rational" principles derived from outside that tradition (from
"the world") is another matter. Blinded by its faults, he may be unable to
appreciate its virtues; accustomed to criticizing it from the outside, he may
be unable to use it as a standard of judgment for reforming the world;
estranged from its principles, he may be unable to rally the community
defined by the tradition to reformation or renewal. These are, admittedly,
questions of degree. But Perry so emphasizes the need for perpetual
change, revision, criticism, and reform, and so praises radical religious
movements (the only religious tradition he describes as "great" is libera-
tion theology"0) as to suggest that the best traditions are those that are in
the process of abandoning their traditional moorings.
In the final analysis, Professor Perry's conventionalist moral theory
seems to contain the seeds of its own destruction. Our only access to
"moral knowledge" is through our moral traditions; yet we have an obli-
gation to subject our moral traditions to "self-critical rationality." His ap-
proach conjures up the vision of a student trying to warm himself in a
freezing library, burning the very books he needs to find answers to his
questions.
Perhaps the problem is that Perry takes his conventionalism one step
too far. He sometimes appears to claim, not merely that beliefs obtained
after properly critical reflection on moral tradition are the best access we
have to moral knowlege, but that such beliefs are moral knowledge.31 I
can agree that the most promising means of obtaining moral knowledge is
to immerse oneself in a worthy moral tradition; that this is superior to
acquiescence in the moral fads of the moment; that this is superior to an
30. P. 183.
31. P. 28.
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application of one's own powers of abstract reason. But this is a means for
obtaining knowledge; it is not knowledge itself.
II. ON INTERPRETING SACRED TEXTS
The appropriate attitude toward tradition is all the more important if
we pursue Professor Perry's analogy between the role of the Constitution
in American political life and the role of a sacred text in the life of a
religious community. Consider Perry's description:
In [a religious] community, the sacred text is not-not simply, at any
rate-a book of answers, but rather a principal symbol of, perhaps
the principal symbol of, and thus a central occasion of recalling and
heeding, the fundamental aspirations of the tradition. In that sense,
the sacred text constantly disturbs-it serves a prophetic function
in-the life of the community.3 2
So also, says Perry, "[a]s a principal symbol of fundamental aspirations of
the American political tradition, the constitutional text constantly dis-
turbs-it serves a prophetic function in-the life of the political
community.""3
Professor Perry's analogy depends on his readers having some familiar-
ity with the way in which religious communities interact with their sacred
texts. (It must be noted, however, that his argument does not depend on
his analogy.34) This, in turn, presupposes that there is some paradigmatic
posture toward scripture that might be said to be typical of "religious
communities" in general. If different religious communities interact with
their sacred texts in fundamentally different ways, Perry's analogy loses
its force; indeed, the analogy may undermine his claim to have discovered
a hermeneutical approach to textual interpretation that will command
wide acceptance in the American political community.
Unfortunately, and despite Perry's obvious sincerity in seeking to con-
sider and respect religious traditions other than his own, his paradigmatic
religious community is far from typical-even if we confine our attention
to the principal religious traditions of the United States. It certainly does
not describe the self-understanding of Orthodox Jews, who do indeed look
to their sacred texts for "answers" to specific questions-and find them.
(Orthodox Jews recognize 613 specific religious commands, or mitzvot,
that they strive to obey; if they could obey them all consistently, a hercu-
lean if not impossible task, they would have lived a perfect life.) The Or-
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lesser extent, by some Christian persuasions such as the Amish and the
fundamentalists.
Perry's description comes closer to mainstream Protestant and Catholic
thought, but even there his description is in tension with the more tradi-
tional elements within those religious communities. Evangelical and other
"conservative" 5 Protestants use scripture as a vantage point for criticizing
present-day institutions and practices. But they do not believe it necessary
or appropriate to "revise the community's form of life in the light of new
experience and exigencies." 6 Quite the contrary. In evangelical circles, it
is common to distinguish between the "biblical" and the "cultural." The
former is fixed and authoritative; the latter is changing and open to ques-
tion. "New experiences and exigencies" are strictly "cultural." Nor is a
"critical" attitude toward the scriptures encouraged. The unifying theme
of conservative Protestantism is its insistence on the inerrancy of the in-
spired Word of God, as it came from God. 7 Evangelicals understand the
scriptures as an unchanging source of revealed truth against which they
must judge their own actions, their community's life together, and the
practices of the world.
This attitude does not differ greatly from traditional Roman Catholi-
cism, but traditional Catholics also believe that the church leadership,
most particularly the Pope, has access to revealed truth (the "magiste-
rium") to which individual believers are not privy. This gives teaching
authority to the bishops, in communion with the Pope; individual believ-
ers must subordinate their reading of the scriptures to the authoritative
pronouncements of the Church. This is one of the principal points of dif-
ference between Protestants (not just evangelicals) and Catholics. To the
Protestant, each individual believer is able to read and interpret the scrip-
tures for himself, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. While the teach-
ing of church leaders is entitled to respect (and in practice receives great
deference), and while church leaders have the ultimate authority to deter-
mine who may participate in the life of the religious community, for Prot-
estants God alone is lord of the conscience, and scripture alone is the au-
thority for spiritual judgments. For Catholics, however, any reading of the
Bible must be mediated by experience, tradition, and institutional
authority.38
Professor Perry's description of the role of sacred texts in the religious
community conforms to neither the conservative Protestant nor the tradi-
35. I regret the use of political terminology-"liberal" and "conservative"-to describe theological
movements, but the usage is standard. See, e.g., D. KELLEY, WHY CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES ARE
GROWING (1972); W. ROOF & W. MCKINNEY, AMERICAN MAINLINE RELIGION: ITS CHANGING
SHAPE AND FUTURE (1987).
36. P. 139.
37. See S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 812-16 (1972).
38. See R. NEUHAUS, THE CATHOLIC MOMENT: THE PARADOX OF THE CHURCH IN THE
POSTMODERN WORLD 4-13 (1987).
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tional Catholic view. On the one hand, it suggests a loose and critical
posture toward scripture that evangelicals and other conservative Protes-
tants are united in rejecting. On the other hand, it suggests a confronta-
tional posture toward the church's structure and tradition that traditional
Catholics would consider presumptuous.
Which religious community does Perry have in mind? His references to
religious authorities give a clue: most are exponents of the modern Ameri-
can variant of Catholicism, exemplified by the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops and the so-called "liberal" or "progressive" wing of
Catholic theologians at major American centers of Catholic scholarship. 9
This religious community conforms rather well to Perry's description. It
concerns itself deeply and intensively with criticism and change, both of
church practices (the male celibate priesthood, the posture toward homo-
sexuality, the teaching against artificial birth control, the authority of the
Pope) and of society at large (reliance on nuclear weapons, organization
of the economy, policy toward Marxist movements in Central America). It
challenges church authority. It is open to innovative exegeses of the Bible,
even to the rejection of some passages that conflict with modern views of
morality, history, science, or human nature. Perry himself describes the
paradigmatic religious tradition as one that employs "the sort of interpre-
tation of sacred texts that presupposes no more than that the texts are
human artifacts and repositories of human wisdom."40 It would seem that,
when choosing a religious community to serve as paradigmatic for all reli-
gious communities, Professor Perry has chosen his own."'
Needless to say, the approach to sacred texts that Perry describes is
controversial. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the traditionalist Catholic theo-
logian (Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and
President of the International Theological Commission and the Pontifical
Biblical Commission), has described some examples of the approach as
"not even claim[ing] to be an understanding of the text itself in the man-
ner in which it was originally intended."42 According to Cardinal Ratz-
inger, modern critical liberal theology expresses the view that the "Bible's
message is in and of itself inexplicable, or else that it is meaningless for
39. That the Bishops' Conference and the principal American Catholic theological schools are
presently in conflict both with Rome and with Catholic traditionalism is apparent from recent church
controversies. See, e.g., Steinfels, Academic Freedom is Key Issue in Suit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1988,
§ 1, at 30, col. 6 (discussing lawsuit by prominent Catholic theologian dismissed by Vatican from
Catholic University for deviations from official Catholic theology); Goldman, U.S. Bishops Reject Bid
by Vatican to Curb Role, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1988, at A20, col. 5 (reporting vote by American
bishops to reject draft Vatican document that would limit teaching authority of Bishops' Conference).
On the posture of the modern American Catholic Church generally, see J. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN
CATHOLC EXPERIENCE (1986); R. NEUHAUS, supra note 38.
40. P. 143 (entire quotation italicized in original).
41. On the last page of the book, Professor Perry identifies himself as a Catholic, and his treat-
ment of Catholic sources indicates his allegiance within the Church.
42. Ratzinger, Biblical Interpretation in Crisis, THIS WORLD, Summer 1988, at 3, 5 (Erasmus
Lecture #4).
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life in today's world. ' 4 3 Fundamentalists, evangelicals, other conservative
Protestants, and Orthodox Jews might well have even harsher things to
say.44
Let us, then, expand Professor Perry's analogy to include the ways in
which other American religious communities interact with their sacred
texts. Of course, this will be a generalization, perhaps even a caricature;
but it may illustrate the limitations of Professor Perry's approach.4 5
Constitutional interpretation, performed in the manner of Orthodox
Jews and Christian fundamentalists, would seek specific answers to spe-
cific questions from a particular time in the past (presumably the found-
ing), and would enforce those answers in today's world, notwithstanding
considerable pressure arising from changes in context and circumstance.
This would look rather like the "specific intentionalism" of some legal
commentators, most notably Raoul Berger. 6
Constitutional interpretation, performed in the manner of evangelicals
and other conservative Protestants, would seek unchanging principles in
the Constitution's text, structure, and history, and would attempt to apply
those principles to modern questions in the spirit of the principles rather
than necessarily of the specific contexts addressed by the framers. As in
Biblical interpretation, there are no mechanical rules to achieve this re-
sult, but one can identify the proper attitude to bring to the task: the
desire to learn from the sources, the determination to conform one's deci-
-ions to what one learns, and the willingness to put aside "cultural" and
other prejudices, including the fashionable and the modern. This would
look something like "originalism," at least in its most attractive form, the
form described by Professor Perry. It may or may not be significant that
this is the posture toward sacred texts with which the framers and ra-
tifiers of the Constitution would have been most familiar.
Constitutional interpretation, performed in the manner of traditional
Catholics, would regard Supreme Court decisions as of (almost?) equal
weight to the Constitution as originally understood. Constitutional law
would consist of a progression of decisions by the Court. The nation
would rely on the cumulative institutional wisdom of the judiciary, rather
than on the precise contours of the original plan of government. The key
question in constitutional analysis would be the orderly unfolding of pre-
43. Id. at 5-6.
44. See, e.g., J. MACHEN, CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM 172-73 (1923) (arguing that liber-
alism differs from Christianity on full range of fundamental issues).
45. Readers may wish to compare Sanford Levinson's discussion of "Protestant" and "Catholic"
modes of constitutional interpretation, in S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17-53 (1988). See
also Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
46. See, e.g., R. BERGER, EXECUTnvE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); R. BER-
GER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). For my analysis of Berger's
approach, see McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design (Book Review), 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1484 (1987).
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cedent (though no exponent of this approach takes as strong a view of
stare decisis as that accorded in official Catholic theory to the ex cathedra
pronouncements of the Pope). This approach to constitutional law would
look something like common law adjudication."'
Professor Perry's modern American liberal Catholic approach gives
some weight to the Constitution as originally understood. "To say that the
judge should rely on her own beliefs . ..is not to say that she should
ignore original beliefs. She should not. The ratifiers, too, were partici-
pants in the tradition."4 It also accords respect to past decisions of the
Court. "She should not ignore [the beliefs of past judges]-including 'pre-
cedent'-or, indeed, any other source that may shed light on the problem
before the court."149 But after due consideration of the Constitution as
originally understood and of precedent, the "thoughtful judge will rely on
her own beliefs. . ... 50 And the judge will do so in a way that is "trans-
formative"-that "disturbs" the political community. This looks rather
like modern judicial activism.
My point is not that the modern American liberal Catholic posture to-
ward sacred texts is wrong, though it is not mine. I suggest only that
Perry's deployment of the analogy is parochial. It is not true, as he seems
to suggest, that the experience of "religious communities" points to a par-
ticular understanding of interpretation, which should be applied to consti-
tutional interpretation. If anything, the experiences of most religious com-
munities in this country through most of our history point toward other
understandings of interpretation.
This raises the troubling question of authority, a question Perry's anal-
ogy sidesteps. In the American constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court
is the ultimate expositor of constitutional meaning, within the context of a
case or controversy. There is no ultimate expositor of religious meaning
(at least none that is shared). In the absence of an ultimate interpreter,
the religious community can enrich its life by listening to different and
inconsistent readings of religious texts and traditions. None has the power
to impose its view on the others.
Similarly, insofar as the Constitution serves to inform the political con-
science of each political actor-making both citizen and official more con-
scious of the values of separation of powers, free speech, religious free-
dom, due process, equal protection, private property, and so forth-there
is no problem with "nonoriginalist" interpretation. Indeed, there is no
problem with political actors turning to natural law, science fiction, the
47. For an example, see Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445
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New York Times editorial page, or "any other source that may shed light
on the problem.""1 There is no requirement that all participants agree on
the proper sources; each source can enrich the discussion of the public
good.
But insofar as the Constitution limits the range of democratic choice
through the decisions of the Supreme Court, this latitudinarian posture is
impossible. If a single body of nine religious judges were authorized to set
forth the minimum permissible content of the sacred text-an interpreta-
tion to which the rest of the community would be compelled to con-
form-I suspect Professor Perry would join with me in wishing that they
would stick to the common core of agreed-upon essentials, leaving more
contentious propositions to bodies whose judgements are less final and
conclusive.
III. ON LIBERALISM
Having set forth his methodology for evaluating claims about moral
knowledge, Professor Perry proceeds to the question of the proper rela-
tionship between morality and coercion in the pluralistic American politi-
cal community. "How ought politics and law to respond," he asks, "to the
reality of deep, pervasive, persistent moral dissensus? '' 52 His approach to
the question is a combination of positive and normative argument-a posi-
tive argument about what the American political tradition in fact stands
for, and a normative argument about what it ought to stand for. "The
vision of the proper relation between morality and politics I offer here,"
he says, "is a vision already realized, already embodied, to some extent, in
the practices of the American political-constitutional community. Thus,
although my discussion is presciptive [sic], it is, to some extent, descriptive
as well."53
Perry begins his political theory by arguing that what he calls "the
liberal vision" of the relationship between morality and politics is a "fail-
ure." 4 This should immediately cause the reader to doubt whether his
"positive argument"-that his normative commitments are "already em-
bodied" in the American political tradition-is entirely accurate. We live,
after all, in the most thoroughly liberal political community in the history
of the world, a community in which virtually all serious political figures
from Barry Goldwater to George McGovern are "liberals."
The liberal vision, according to Perry, is that "our politics and law
must aim to be 'neutral' or 'impartial' among the basic differences that







politics that transcends the deep, pervasive, persistent differences among
us-a politics less divided, less fragmented, than we, a politics that unites
us. . .. " The liberal vision, he says, is "noble." But it is also futile.
"[O]ur politics and law simply cannot be neutral or impartial among the
differences that constitute the dissensus. The relation between morality/
religion and politics/law envisioned by liberal political philosophy is im-
possible to achieve." 56
Professor Perry supports his thesis through a brief critique of three
modern liberal thinkers: John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Ronald
Dworkin. To Rawls he responds that there are no principles of justice
that satisfy Rawls' criterion-that the principles adopted by the State
must transcend the subjective circumstances of fundamental disagreement
about the good. To Ackerman he responds that no principle of distribu-
tion can pass Ackerman's own neutrality principle. To Dworkin he re-
sponds that, contrary to Dworkin's own criteria of liberalism, his princi-
ples rely implicitly on a particular conception of the good. In short, "any
liberal theory in which no particular conception or range of conceptions of
human good plays a role in the derivation of a principle or principles of
justice [] is doomed to failure." '57 He insists that "there is a need for 'a
religious or philosophical preface to politics.' "58
Thus, Professor Perry rejects the notion of "liberalism-as-neutrality."
He says it is "a phantom, a will o' the wisp."59 Notwithstanding his
sweeping remarks about the "liberal political-philosophical project," how-
ever, Perry embraces a different kind of liberalism, which he calls "liber-
alism-as-tolerance." 6 "Liberalism-as-tolerance" holds that, while in prin-
ciple a "coercive strategy" for government is "an important means" of
protecting "interests the satisfaction of which significantly enhances one's
level of well-being and the frustration of which significantly diminishes
it,"'61 there are powerful pragmatic reasons why the political community
should use its coercive power sparingly. Perry lists six such reasons: (1)
there is always a risk that the government decision may be wrong; (2)
coercion may stifle "new or unusual ways of life" that, if not suppressed,
might contribute to society's "self-critical rationality"; (3) one might not
always be in power, and a tradition of non-coercion would be valuable "in
the event the winds change"; (4) coercion causes suffering; (5) coercion is
"corrosive" of the sense of community; and (6) "extreme" coercion can
55. P. 55.
56. Pp. 55-56. For an argument that this neutral or impartial understanding does not adequately
describe liberal thought, see West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal
Vision, 46 U. PIT. L. REv. 673 (1985).
57. Pp. 71-72.
58. P. 87 (quoting Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE
FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 257, 264 (M. Peterson & R. Vaughan eds. 1988)).
59. P. 102.
60. Pp. 72, 102.
61. P. 97.
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violate individual conscience." Thus, according to Perry, the political
community need not (cannot) be neutral, but it should be tolerant. Partici-
pants in the political life have no choice but to rely on their moral beliefs,
including their religious beliefs about the human good, when determining
public policy. But in so doing they should have "a strong reluctance to
rely on coercive legislative strategies." 6
These are good reasons, all of them, for avoiding coercion when possi-
ble. But they are also contingent: factors to be weighed in the balance
rather than principles to be obeyed. The state is to be tolerant. As James
Madison argued in a similar context, the word "toleration" implies a
privilege or forbearance accorded by legislative grace, rather than a right
that is the natural inheritance of humankind." Liberalism-as-tolerance
implies that the government is vested with full authority to act coercively
when those in power believe it to be right. For excellent reasons, the gov-
ernment ought not exercise these powers to their fullest, but there can be
no question that the authority is there. (And Perry reminds us that it does
not matter whether the coercive strategy is "paternalistic, nonpaternalistic,
or both."6 The government has full authority to act coercively against us
even in our own interest.)
Liberalism-as-tolerance is not the liberalism of the Constitution. Con-
stitutional liberalism is neither the "phantom" neutrality of Rawls-Acker-
man-Dworkin nor the contingent toleration of Professor Perry. Rather, it
begins with the proposition that each person has a right to his life, liberty,
and property. These are not mere privileges, to be enjoyed at the suffer-
ance of the state. We may be deprived of our lives, liberty, and property
only by laws that have been approved by our representatives through pre-
scribed procedures, pursuant to constitutional grants of power by the peo-
ple to the governing authorities, for particular ends, with particular limi-
tations even within those ends. For constitutional liberals, liberty requires
no justification: it is coercion that requires justification, and the consent of
the governed is the only allowable justification.
Professor Perry does not face up to the central difference between polit-
ical communities and moral-religious communities: governments can use
force and private associations cannot. To judge from the metaphors he
uses, Perry believes that politics is very like a conversation. He says that
politics should be seen as an instrument for the "transformation of prefer-
62. Pp. 98-102.
63. P. 102.
64. The context was the drafting of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. For an account of the
controversy, see W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 3-6 (1985). Later, in THE RIGHTS OF MAN,
Thomas Paine went a step further than Madison: "Toleration is not the opposite of intoleration, but
is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty
of conscience, and the other of granting it." T. PAINE, Rights of Man, pt. 1 (1791), in THE LIFE AND
MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 291 (P. Foner ed. 1945).
65. P. 102.
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ences through public and rational discussion."6 He says that "our polit-
ical life includes ongoing moral discourse with one another in an effort to
achieve ever more insightful answers to the questions of what are our real
interests, as opposed to our actual preferences, and thus what sort of per-
sons-with what projects, goals, ideals-ought we to be."' 7 But politics is
more than a discussion. After moral discourse is over, even if some parties
remain unconvinced, the prevailing party's moral beliefs attain the force
and effect of law. That is why politics is so scary.
It is difficult to see why a naturalist moral philosopher would look to
politics as the preferred forum for the transformation of preferences. The
application of force is less likely to result in "insightful answers" than
continued discussion and disagreement. Contrary to Perry's belief, liberals
do not assume (at least, my kind of liberal does not assume) that "existing
sensibilities" or "existing preferences" should be "take[n] as a given" or
with an "uncritical attitude." 8 We are all for testing existing preferences
through deliberation and debate. But deliberation and debate, especially
over the highest things-matters of ultimate truth and value-is best con-
ducted in forums where the ties of common experience are closer and the
threat of coercion is absent: the communities of church, synagogue, club,
political association, debating society, university, labor union (if volunta-
rily joined), communications media, dinner table, and so forth. The politi-
cal community, being more comprehensive, must necessarily be more het-
erogeneous. It cannot seek "moral knowledge" in quite the same way.
When the prospect of coercion is introduced, it is better, insofar as possi-
ble, to agree to disagree, especially about the highest things. Perhaps I am
wrong about this; but I can claim as authority the Constitution itself,
which forbids the government from even attempting to iron out our differ-
ences with respect to the highest things. 9 (Of course, the Constitution did
not establish a regime of pure libertarianism: the founders "agreed to
agree"-or at least to acquiesce in the decisions of representative institu-
tions-about many questions, including war and peace, taxation and
spending, crime and punishment. But not about religion.)
It is strange, to say the least, that in a book about the relation between
what Perry calls "morality/religion" and "politics/law"70 he does not at-
tempt to relate his constitutional vision to the establishment or free exer-
cise principles of the First Amendment. These principles are a clue that
66. P. 152 (quoting Elster, Sour Grapes-Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants, in UTILITA-
RIANISM AND BEYOND 219, 23 (1981)) (emphasis added); see also p. 81.
67. P. 152 (emphasis added).
68. Pp. 80-81.
69. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."). For an account of how the Religion Clauses relate to
the political theory of the Constitution as a whole, see McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985
Sup. CT. REv. 1, 14-24.
70. P. 72.
19891 1517
The Yale Law Journal
Perry's vision is not the vision of the Constitution. It has been said that
"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. "" How can politics
serve as the instrument for transformation of preferences-for achieve-
ment of moral knowledge-without establishing a public orthodoxy? How
can politics tell us what our "real interests" should be, or "what sort of
persons-with what projects, goals, ideals" we ought to be, if the ques-
tions of ultimate truth and value are constitutionally committed to each
person's conscience, as it may be informed by his religious faith and
tradition?
IV. ON EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND CONSENT
Professor Perry is absolutely correct about one thing: constitutional lib-
eralism, like other systems of political theory, presupposes a particular
view about the good life, which in turn is based on a particular view
about the nature of man. But he is oddly incurious about what moral
beliefs lie behind constitutional liberalism. For a scholar committed to the
view that the fundamental aspirations of our political tradition form the
basis for moral knowledge within our political community, he is surpris-
ingly silent about the causes that impelled the American people towards
the separate and equal station to which they believed the laws of nature
and of nature's God entitled them.
The Founders of the American political community held as "self-evi-
dent" certain moral beliefs ("truths") about the nature of man and the
good life, and the political principles that follow from these truths. These
surely qualify as fundamental aspirations of our political tradition, under
Perry's definition, and are therefore worthy of attention. The three most
important elements of this moral-philosophic theory are equality, individ-
ual rights, and government by consent. Perry, it turns out, is skeptical
about equality and ambivalent toward the other two.
A. Equality
Perry does not mention the Declaration, but at one point he comments:
"I don't know what it means to say that one human being is intrinsically
superior to another." 2 This implies-indirectly but ineluctably-that he
also does not know what it means to say that one human being is intrinsi-
cally equal to another. If there is no "ultimate standard of comparison"
that could tell us that A is superior to B, there is also no "ultimate stan-
dard of comparison" that could tell us that A is equal to B. One is as




baseless an assertion as the other. Accordingly, Perry can neither affirm
nor deny the Declaration's first "self-evident truth". He cannot base a
political theory on it. In effect, Perry has signalled that his moral philoso-
phy is rooted in something other than the tradition of Jefferson, Madison,
and Lincoln. This does not make Perry wrong-but it must cause us to be
wary of his claim that his "vision of the proper relation between morality
and politics . . . is a vision already realized, already embodied, to some
extent, in the practices of the American political-constitutional
community." 3
Perry explains his skepticism about "intrinsic superiority" in an
endnote:
Imagine two human beings, A and B. To say that A is superior to B
seems to be to say that A compares favorably to B in terms of some
factor X, like strength, intelligence, or race. But what does it mean to
say that A is intrinsically superior to B? That A compares favorably
to B not in terms of some X, but period? If that is what it means,
then the statement is incoherent, because A and B cannot be com-
pared at all except in terms of some X. Perhaps "A is intrinsically
superior to B" means that A compares favorably to B in terms of
some X, which is not merely intrinsically good, but better than any
other factor, including any factor in terms of which B compares fa-
vorably to A. In that case, X would have to be the ultimate standard
of comparison. How might one defend the claim that X is the ulti-
mate standard of comparison? By asserting that one simply
knows-"intuits"-it?7 4
Professor Perry apparently assumes his rhetorical question is unan-
swerable. Let us attempt to answer it. Is there an X that is the ultimate
standard of comparison between human beings? The central question ad-
dressed by Perry's "naturalist" moral philosophy is how human beings
"are to live the most deeply satisfying lives of which they are capable."
He tells us that "moral knowledge is knowledge of how to live so as to
flourish, to achieve well-being. '7 5 Presumably, therefore, the ultimate
standard of comparison between individuals must have something to do
with "flourishing," if flourishing is the most important-most deeply sat-
isfying-thing. It does not follow, however, that A is superior to B if A
has a superior capacity for flourishing, since by definition flourishing is to
live the "most deeply satisfying life of which one is capable." Since one's
degree of flourishing is relative to one's capability (rather than to an abso-
lute or interpersonal standard), all are by definition equal in their capac-
ity to flourish. But this equality is definitional, or tautological.
73. P. 76.
74. P. 257, n.31.
75. P. I1.
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A harder and more important question is whether all are equal in their
capacity to know what it means to "flourish." This could be an "ultimate
standard of comparison." If A is "intrinsically superior" to B, it could
mean that A has a better understanding than B of how to flourish. It
follows that B would be better off if he submitted (or were forced to sub-
mit) to rule by A. Infants and lunatics are examples: they need guardians
to rule over them for their own good. This is what Aristotle called a "nat-
ural slave": "all men who differ from others as much as the body differs
from the soul, or an animal from a man. . . all such are by nature slaves,
and it is better for them . . . to be ruled by a master.""8 To be intrinsi-
cally inferior is to be of such diminished moral capacity that someone else
is a superior judge of your own interest. Conversely, to be equal-in the
sense that term is used in the Declaration-is to be what Aristotle called a
"freeman": a person who is the best judge of his own interest.77
Professor Perry does not share the Declaration's belief that each person
is equal, i.e., the best judge of his own interest. This is most clearly re-
vealed in his criticism of "experience-utilitarianism," which he summa-
rizes as follows, quoting Dan W. Brock:
[Flor persons to be happy is for them to be undergoing a conscious
experience that they like or enjoy for its own sake . . . .On the
happiness conception then, it is conscious experience enjoyed for its
own sake that has intrinsic value, and each person is in a privileged
position for determining what they enjoy or what makes them
happy."8
"This conception of human good or well-being," according to Perry, "is
utterly implausible." Why?
Perry explains: "To achieve the mental state in question [happiness] is
not necessarily to have achieved well-being or even to have come close. It
is not necessarily to be flourishing.""9 The problem with experience-utili-
tarianism is that "[w]hat makes a person 'happy' depends on her sensibili-
ties, yet a person's sensibilities might be antithetical to, subversive of, her
76. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I. V., § 8, at 13 (E. Barker trans. 1946).
77. Surprisingly, in light of his announced methodology, Professor Perry does not inquire into the
religious roots of the doctrine of equality. Compare p. 183 (criticizing "secular leftists" who often fail
"to explore some of the richest resources for thinking about the human: the resources of the great
religious traditions"). The equality of all souls before God is an essential element in Christian doc-
trine, especially in the Protestant tradition that informed the American Revolution. The Protestant
notion of equality ("the priesthood of all believers") is conceptually quite close to the Declaration, in
that it affirms that each believer has equal access to knowledge of the divine will through the scrip-
tures, and thus to answers to the question: How shall we live? See M. LUTHER, THREE TREATISES
21-22 (Muhlenberg Press ed. 1943).
78. P. 79 (quoting Brock, Utilitarianism, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 217, 222 (1982)).
79. P. 79.
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flourishing.""0 He gives the example of the sadist or masochist who none-
theless considers himself "happy."
This suggests that Perry's objection to experience-utilitarianism might
be based on its use of the term "happiness" (as opposed to "flourishing")
to denote the good life. Interestingly, the same term, in the form "pursuit
of happiness," is used in the Declaration, and I assume this usage is sub-
ject to the same objection. But surely Perry is aware of the philosophical
history of the term "happiness," which long predates experience-utilitari-
anism and the Declaration. Perry calls himself a "neo-Aristotelian." ' 1 Ar-
istotle devotes his Nicomachean Ethics to the meaning of happiness. Con-
sider the following:
What is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to
something else is called final in an unqualified sense. This descrip-
tion seems to apply to happiness above all else: for we always choose
happiness as an end in itself and never for the sake of something
else.82
Aristotle, like the modern experience-utilitarian, identifies the highest
good with the good "in itself"-the good that is not chosen for the "sake
of something else." This good they call "happiness." So understood, the
term "happiness" does not appear to differ significantly from Perry's pre-
ferred term "flourishing."
A more substantial ground for Perry's objection to experience-utilitari-
anism is based on the utilitarian's belief that "each person is in a privi-
leged position for determining what they enjoy or what makes them
happy." An individual's "sensibilities," Perry says, may be "antithetical
to, subversive of, her flourishing." Such a person would be better off
under someone else's governance. As he says, "[i]t simply makes no sense
to give priority to satisfaction of a person's mistaken preferences rather
than to strategies for correcting her mistaken vision of her possibilities and
of what she would find most deeply satisfying.2
8 3
At one level, this is obviously true; Perry's examples of sadists and mas-
ochists are to the point. But the experience-utilitarian does not, as I read
him, make the claim that each person will invariably make the right
choices. Rather, he claims that "each person is in a privileged position"
for determining the right choices. In other words, no one else is in a better
position than the individual himself to determine how he should live. That
human beings are fallible does not mean that human beings are unequal
in this most important respect. Rulers, no less than subjects, can make
80. P. 80.
81. P. 180.
82. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I., § 7, 1097a-1097b, at 15 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
83. P. 80.
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choices "antithetical to, subversive of" the good life. They have even been
known to be sadists and masochists. If all human beings are equal, then
each is in a "privileged position" to determine for himself how to flourish.
It is a natural right, an intrinsic part of being an adult human being, that
we can engage in the pursuit of happiness-the quest for the good life-as
we understand it. It is better to err as an autonomous being than to live
well as a slave.
B. Rights and Consent
From the axiom that "all men are created equal" follow the twin pro-
positions that they have certain "unalienable rights" and that the "just
powers" of governments derive from the "consent of the governed." The
doctrines of "rights" and "consent" are linked because no person has a
natural claim to rule over another.8 The only presumptively legitimate
"strategy" for A to "correct" B's "mistaken vision of her possibilities"85 is
by persuasion and consent, as distinguished from force or fraud. (Of
course, A and B can agree to abide by the results of some previously-
arranged decisionmaking process, for example, majority rule. As long as A
and B continue to live within and reap the benefits of their compact, they
can be said to have "consented" to laws properly enacted, even if they do
not agree with them.)
The political significance of the Declaration's self-evident truths, there-
fore, is that the only just form of government is self-government, in two
senses of the word. The liberal sense of self-government is that each per-
son must be free to order his own affairs in most respects, except as it
affects other persons or society as a whole. Governmental intervention is
exceptional. The republican sense of self-government is that each person
must be permitted to participate in the process of government; we govern
ourselves if we are equal participating members of the political commu-
nity (even if we do not necessarily agree with the collective decisions of the
community).88 Thus, both aspects of liberal democracy-individual rights
and political participation-are bottomed on the premise of equality. If all
were not equal, if some were better than others in the fundamental sense
84. On the doctrines of rights and consent in early liberal thought, see R. SMITH, LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26-32, 41-45 (1985).
85. P. 80.
86. The American political community was not perfectly republican in this sense at the time of
the founding. Decisions about the suffrage were deliberately left to the states, many of which had
property qualifications and all of which restricted the vote to adult white males. See U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 2 (election of Representatives); art. I, § 3 (election of Senators); art. II, § I (election of President).
However, it is striking that at each expansion of the franchise, advocates invoked the principle of the
Declaration of Independence (the "just powers" of government are derived from "the consent of the
governed") and opponents were unable to summon forth arguments of comparable authority. In a
sense, therefore, it can be said that the principle of universal suffrage was present from the founding,
simply requiring time for its ultimate vindication.
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of being better judges of how to flourish, then some form of aristocracy
(rule of the good) might be preferable, in theory, to liberal democracy."7
The Constitution itself is neither radically liberal nor radically demo-
cratic. It would be impossible to be both. The Constitution allows many
interferences with individual freedom, when authorized through demo-
cratic procedures. But the constitutional system is most liberal with re-
spect to the matters most central to flourishing-the freedoms associated
with the speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment. Nor is the
Constitution thoroughly democratic; indeed, it was specifically designed to
avoid the pitfalls of unbridled democracy, especially the dangers to indi-
vidual rights. But this was accomplished without introduction of aristo-
cratic or monarchical elements; all authority stems, even if indirectly, from
the choices of the people. The constitutional scheme was designed and
defended as "a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to repub-
lican government."8" It represents a skillful-if sometimes uncomforta-
ble-accommodation of the two aspects of self-government espoused by
the Declaration.
Despite his skepticism about a political theory predicated on equality,
Professor Perry is neither illiberal nor anti-democratic. He is, however,
ambivalent toward both liberalism and democracy, toward both rights and
consent. His liberalism, as we have seen, is contingent; it is not based on
rights that inhere in the individual but on a posture of toleration by the
state. Among the six reasons he has given for using coercion sparingly,
none, with the possible exception of violations of "individual conscience"
(an argument he makes applicable only to "extreme coercion"), 9 recog-
nizes the person as an autonomous entity. His liberalism-as-tolerance ac-
cords no weight, in principle, to the possibility that an essential element in
the fully human life is the authority to choose for oneself, whether for
good or for ill.90
As Professor Perry's liberalism is contingent, so also is his commitment
to democratic rule. This is evident in his approach to constitutional law,
the subject of his final, and longest, chapter.
V. ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The legal journals have been filled in recent years with disputation over
the question: How shall the courts interpret the words of the Constitution
87. I say "might," because even if there were wise and good aristocrats, and even if we could
identify them and put them into power (Socrates says against their will), there would still be the
danger that they would abuse their power. More diffuse forms of government might still be the safer
practical alternative.
88. THE FEDERALiST No. 10, at 84 (Madison) (New American Library ed. 1961).
89. P. 101.
90. Following his methodology of moral reasoning, Perry might well have reflected on why, ac-
cording to the principal American religious traditions, a good and all-powerful God decided to leave
open to the original man and woman the choice that would result in their expulsion from paradise.
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of the United States? When differences in nomenclature and issues of evi-
dence and proof are put aside, however, there are only three answers. The
first is that the words should be interpreted as they were understood by
those with the authority to adopt them as law. The second is that the
words should be interpreted as they are now understood, or as they have
been understood, by the American political community. The third is that
the words should be interpreted to produce the best results, as understood
by the person doing the interpreting.9 Much modern academic theorizing
has consisted of debunking the first, making selective use of the second,
and embracing the third.
Professor Perry seems to waver between the second and the third. On
the one hand, he states that "the fundamental, constitutive aspirations of
the American political tradition" are the source of "authorit[y]" in our
legal system.92 This suggests that the understanding of the American peo-
ple over time controls constitutional interpretation. The judge's task,
under this conception, is more historical or sociological than philosophical.
The judge observes aspirations; he does not deduce them. On the other
hand, Perry states that in deciding cases "the judge should rely on her
own beliefs as to what the aspiration requires," and explicitly rejects reli-
ance on beliefs of the majority, or even of a consensus, in cases where the
judge believes that the people are "incorrect."9 " This suggests the judge's
task is more that of moral decisionmaker than observer, though the precise
division of authority between judge and people will depend on the level of
generality with which the "aspiration" is articulated by the judge. In any
event, Perry rejects the proposition that the Constitution should be inter-
preted as it was understood by those with the authority to enact it-but
not because it is unsound or incoherent on its own terms. Indeed, he de-
fends this "originalist" view against some of the more common arguments
against it. As Perry notes, "Because critics of originalism often miscon-
ceive it, they end up attacking a straw man."' " The "most prevalent mis-
conception," he says, "is that originalism requires the Court to answer the
question the way the ratifiers would have answered it in our day, were
they still living."9 5 This question, he notes, is unanswerable and irrele-
vant. "Rather, the originalist project is to discover what belief(s) the ra-
tifiers constitutionalized, and then to decide the case on the basis of that
belief."96 He also rejects the argument that the important provisions of the
91. Cutting across these approaches are two concerns of an institutional nature: the deference to
be paid to decisions of the representative branches of government and the deference to be paid to past
judicial decisions. As a logical matter, any of the three answers limned in the text can be approached
with more or less deference to representative bodies and precedent.
92. P. 162.
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Constitution, as originally understood, require the exercise of vast and un-
bridled judicial discretion. "[I]t does not seem to me plausible to suppose
that the ratifiers of any constitutional provision constitutionalized a belief
so indeterminate or 'general' that reliance on it necessitates judges acting
inconsistently with originalism's democratic premises. ' 97 Perry concludes
that "[o]riginalism is fundamentally sound," quoting historian Jack
Rakove to the effect that "'a historical approach to the problem of the
original understanding can produce more rewarding results than . . .
[critics of originalism] are ordinarily prepared to concede.' "98
Indeed, if originalism were unsound, the legal system would be in
trouble, since it is essentially the method used for interpreting other legal
instruments-statutes, contracts, wills, treaties-which are interpreted in
light of the understanding of those who enacted or entered into them.
Why this process should be thought impossible for the Constitution but
natural and inevitable in every other area is something of a mystery.
One of the myths about originalism is that its adherents believe it
would eliminate the need for judicial judgment and discretion-that it
would make constitutional interpretation mechanical. This is absurd. Few
litigated issues are resolved by ready reference to Madison's Notes. The
best we can hope for in some cases is that judges will steep themselves in
the history and philosophy of the Constitution and attempt to apply it
faithfully. Of course this assumes the Constitution has an intelligible phi-
losophy-that it is neither a mishmash of political compromises nor a con-
geries of inscrutable phrases. But while this cannot be deduced from first
principles or established empirically in the space of a book review, it is my
experience and conviction that the Constitution is an elegant and profound
statement of a highly attractive conception of government.
Indeed, this-not just its greater compatibility with democracy, as
Perry holds-is the great appeal of originalism.9" Whatever one's theory
of constitutional interpretation, judges will be engaged in the difficult task
of measuring the facts of concrete cases against the abstractions of moral
principles. The appeal of originalism is that the moral principles so ap-
plied will be the foundational principles of the American Repub-
lic-principles we can all perceive for ourselves and that have shaped our
nation's political character-and not the political-moral principles of
whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.
Rather than debunking originalism, Perry makes a comparative argu-
ment. His nonoriginalism, he claims, is superior to originalism. His the-
97. P. 130.
98. Pp. 130-31 (ellipses and bracketed material in original) (quoting J. Rakove, Original Mean-
ings of the Constitution: The Historian's Contribution 4 (1985) (unpublished manuscript)).
99. Of course, one feature of the constitutional scheme, as originally understood, is its reliance on
representative institutions-a feature undermined, as Perry points out, by nonoriginalism. Pp.
167-68.
19891 1525
The Yale Law Journal
ory is based on the distinction between the original understanding and the
"aspirational meaning" of the constitutional text. He explains that "what
the constitutional text means to us, what it signifies to us (in addition to
the original meaning), are certain basic, constitutive aspirations or princi-
ples or ideals of the American political community and tradition." 100
"Some provisions of the constitutional text have a meaning in addition to
the original meaning: Some provisions signify fundamental aspirations of
the American political tradition. Not every provision of the text signifies
such aspirations, but some do."'1 '
Perry distinguishes between aspirations that are "signified by" or "not
signified by" the text. Presumably this provides some constraint on judi-
cial decisionmaking. But how much or what it means he never explains. Is
the judgment linguistic (any meaning that might be teased out of the lan-
guage of the text is permissible)? Is it historical (only those meanings that
have been perceived by the American political community over time are
permissible)? Is it a matter of present-day observation (only those mean-
ings that are currently perceived by the American political community are
permissible)? Is it philosophical (any meaning that appears normative is
permissible)? Is it some combination (any meaning that both can be teased
out of the text and also passes one of the other tests is permissible)? I am
confident that the philosophical approach is not what Perry means, since
he tells us that some aspirations signified by the text are not "worth-
while." As to the other possibilities, we are left in the dark. Depending on
the answers, Perry's approach could provide significant constraint-or
virtually none at all.
In any event, Perry's proposed approach to constitutional law is that
judges should "bring to bear" "worthwhile" aspirations that are "signified
by the text" of the Constitution. 0 2 He says that judges should not "bring
to bear" aspirations, however worthwhile, that are not "signified by" the
text,'0 3  or aspirations, however clearly "signified," that are not
"worthwhile.' '10 4
Both halves of this position are problematic. I will address them sepa-
rately. Then I will offer more general comments on Perry's "aspirational"
approach to constitutional interpretation.
A. Governance By Linguistic Accident
Professor Perry wants to persuade us that nonoriginalist interpretation
is "interpretation" nonetheless. This is because he subscribes to the "axio-
matic" proposition that "constitutional cases should be decided on the ba-
100. P. 133.
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sis of, according to, the Constitution."1 5 He states that it would be "a
gross abuse" for a judge to overturn a governmental "policy choice" sim-
ply "because it was a choice she would have opposed as a legislator." 106
He therefore limits judges to enforcing aspirations "signified by" the text.
His constitutional theory, however, seems to depend on separating the
constitutional text from its meaning. It will not work if the same argu-
ments that make the Constitution's original text authoritative also make
its original meaning authoritative.
It is therefore necessary to take a step back and pose the question: why
is the constitutional text authoritative? "Why," in Perry's words, "should
a judge bring to bear, in constitutional cases, only aspirations signified by
the text? Why not all fundamental aspirations, even those not signified by
the text? 1 0 7 Curiously, having posed the question, Perry does not provide
an answer. He states simply that this is "axiomatic." He goes on to state
that "[ijf someone wants to claim that a judge should bring to bear all
fundamental aspirations, or even all worthwhile aspirations, I want to
hear the argument."108 I would rather provide the counter-argument.
"All fundamental aspirations" are not legally authoritative because they
have not been adopted as constitutive principles by the American people.
Under our political theory, all governing authority, including that of
judges, proceeds from the consent of the governed. In Madison's words,
"the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them
that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of gov-
ernment hold their power, is derived."1" One of the proudest claims of
the American people is that they were the first to adopt a form of govern-
ment "from reflection and choice," instead of "accident and force."1 It is
from that reflection and choice that the Constitution derives its authority.
As Chief Justice John Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce
to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American




108. P. 134. Professor Perry has a disconcerting way of shifting the burden of proof. Here, he
takes a proposition as proven because he has not heard a counter-argument. He uses the same tech-
nique again at page 110. Elsewhere, he purports to refute a claim on the ground that the only defense
(of which he is aware) is that "one simply knows-'intuits'-it." Pp. 64, 257-58 n.31. This suggests
that a proposition cannot be proved without an affirmative argument for it. Otherwise, as he points
out, whatever principle "gets the benefit of the presumption-the benefit, that is, of being tested last
and getting to say 'all the others failed, therefore I win (by default)'-will prevail." P. 64. He uses
this second, inconsistent, technique again at pages 64, 65 (criticizing Ackerman); 67 (criticizing Dwor-
kin); 161-62 (criticizing Easterbrook).
109. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313-14 (J. Madison) (New American Library ed. 1961).
110. Id. No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton).
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great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated.
The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental;
and as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can
seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.111
Some say that "we the people" of 1787 had no right to bind our "pos-
terity" 200 years thence-that the consent of the governed rendered in
1787 can have no legal effect in 1989."1 But this objection, even if valid,
would not help Perry's argument. If it were valid, the implication would
not be nonoriginalist, but majoritarian: judges would lose their warrant to
countermand the decisions of today's representative institutions on the ba-
sis of a musty and outmoded Eighteenth century document. The power of
judges cannot logically be expanded by undermining the authoritativeness
of the Constitution.
If one necessary (even if not sufficient) condition for the Constitution to
be authoritative is that it was adopted by the people, then it follows that
principles never adopted by the people cannot be authoritative, even if
they have some linguistic plausibility. Functionally, to apply an unin-
tended meaning is no different from introducing a principle that has no
textual basis whatsoever. The only difference between the unintended
meaning and the extratextual principle is verbal happenstance. Perhaps
an unintended-an accidental-meaning can be said to be "better," or
will seem so to the judge. Precisely the same can be said of other "worth-
while aspirations" that are "not signified by" the text. None of these prin-
ciples were the product of the people's "reflection and choice." None of
these principles properly can be said to be law.
Nor do alternative readings attain democratic warrant on the ground
that they reflect "aspirations" of the American political community-even
assuming that this means beliefs actually commanding a popular consen-
sus and not merely beliefs held by the judge. There are two ways in
which the aspirations of the political community with reference to the
Constitution could diverge from the original understanding: the people
could cease to believe in principles originally intended and they could be-
gin to believe in principles not originally intended. Neither presents an
appropriate occasion for judicial departure from the original meaning.
That the people are disenchanted with a constitutional principle (freedom
of speech during the McCarthy era, perhaps; or the contracts clause dur-
ing the New Deal) can hardly be deemed sufficient reason to cease to
enforce it: the very purpose of a Constitution is to protect certain funda-
mental principles from temporary majorities.
111. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).
112. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 47, at 225. For a compelling response to this argument, see
Holmes, Precommitment and Self-Rule, in CONSTrruTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (J. Elster & R.
Slagstaad eds. forthcoming).
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But if the people come to believe in principles in addition to those origi-
nally intended (and not in conflict with other constitutional principles)
there is no need for judges to enforce them through "interpretation." The
people are free to enact them into law. This happens all the time: the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are conspicu-
ous examples. The only occasion when judicial enforcement through inter-
pretation need occur is when the people are sufficiently divided that the
new aspirations cannot be enacted, or if the people change their minds
and seek to reverse or repeal laws reflecting the new aspirations. But in
these cases, it would seem that the principles are not so firmly established
as to be fundamental constitutive principles of the polity. Whose aspira-
tions are they?
Originalism and noninterpretivism operate from different normative
premises, but each has its own integrity. The force of the originalist argu-
ment is that the people had a right to construct a Constitution, and that
what they enacted should therefore be given effect, including the portions
allocating powers to representative institutions. The force of the usual
noninterpretivist argument is that judges should not be constrained in
their quest to do good, either by the decisions of past generations (the text)
or the beliefs of the majority (aspirations of the community). Professor
Perry's intermediate position contradicts both these premises, but offers no
persuasive normative argument of its own.
Thus, I would like to ask Professor Perry: From where does the judge
derive the authority to enforce an "aspiration" not embodied in the Con-
stitution as originally understood? Is there any answer to this question
that would not also justify the judge in enforcing an "aspiration" not "sig-
nified" by the text? I think not. This does not mean that Perry's theory is
illegitimate under any conceivable standard. But it does mean that it is
illegitimate under the very "axiomatic"" 3 standard he claims to espouse.
B. "Unworthwhile" Aspirations
The problem with the second half of Professor Perry's prescription'11 is
that it allows judges to refuse to enforce principles that both are "signified
by the text" and also are "fundamental aspirations of the American politi-
cal tradition," for the reason that the judge does not consider these princi-
ples "worthwhile." This seems to abandon the notion that judges are sub-
ject to the law. They seem to be able to pick and choose among
constitutional principles on the basis of their own political-moral predilec-
tions, rejecting those they do not agree with. Perry does not illustrate this
approach with any concrete cases. One wonders which elements of our
constitutional tradition he has in mind.
113. P. 132.
114. See text accompanying notes 101-03.
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In any event, by Perry's own lights, this appears illegitimate. Consider
Perry's own words: "If anything is authoritative for public officials in the
American political community, it is, of course, the fundamental, constitu-
tive aspirations of the American political tradition (and the principal tex-
tual embodiment of those aspirations: the Constitution).1 115 What, then, is
the judge's authority for refusing to enforce "unworthwhile" fundamental
aspirations of the American political tradition, signified by the constitu-
tional text?
C. Aspirations
Why does Professor Perry refer repeatedly to constitutional "aspira-
tions," as opposed to more standard legal terms such as law, provision,
principle, requirement, or limitation? He almost never states that a consti-
tutional provision is authoritative; always it is the "aspiration." The
choice of terminology must be significant. Lon Fuller distinguished be-
tween the "morality of duty" and the "morality of aspiration." 116 The
morality of duty "lays down the basic rules without which an ordered
society is impossible. . . . It does not condemn men for failing to embrace
opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it con-
demns them for falling to respect the basic requirements of social living."
The principles of a morality of aspiration "present us rather with a gen-
eral idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain
and infallible directions of acquiring it."11 1 7 The distinctive connotation of
"aspiration," then, is that it is a perfection to be striven for, but never
entirely achieved. Laws, provisions, principles, requirements, and limita-
tions can be complied with. Aspirations are always slightly out of our
reach. That is why, in Perry's words, the Constitution so understood
"constantly disturbs" the life of the political community.
To some extent, the term "aspiration" is not a bad expression for the
principles of the United States Constitution. I have used it myself.11 Few
observers of our national life, I suspect, would be so bold as to claim that
our national, state, and local governments are or ever have been in full
compliance with the Constitution. Who can doubt that the Constitution
115. P. 162.
116. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (1964).
117. Id. at 5-6.
118. See McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 Cn.-KENr L.
REV. 89, 100 (1988):
A defender of constitutional democracy can therefore accept the "aspirational" character of
natural law, and even of the Constitution, without acceding to the theory of open-ended judi-
cial review. The Constitution is chock-full of aspirations. We usually call them, more mun-
danely, constitutional principles. . . . Traditional constitutionalism is not hostile to judicial
enforcement of aspirational principles-if they can fairly be discovered in the text, structure,
and purposes of the Constitution.
For another example of the term used in this sense, see G. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION (1986).
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expresses the aspirations of the founding generation for a regime of lim-
ited and separated powers, with protections for individual rights? Who
can doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment expresses the aspirations of the
American people after the Civil War to achieve equal protection of the
laws for all our citizens without regard to race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude? Who can doubt that, despite our impressive progress,
the governments of this nation still fall short of these aspirations to a not
inconsiderable degree? In this sense, originalism is no less "aspirational"
than nonoriginalism. The only issue is: Which aspirations? Those embod-
ied in the Constitution by the framers and ratifiers? Or others of uncer-
tain origin and untested value?119
But there is another connotation to the term "aspiration" that is more
problematic. In Professor Perry's hands, the term connotes not just a stan-
dard that is difficult to meet, but a continual catalyst for change at a
fundamental level. He insists that constitutional adjudication "at its best,
is a species of deliberative, transformative politics." '12 Aspirations are the
agents of continual social transformation.
Here again, to a degree I agree that provisions of the Constitution were
designed to bring about fundamental changes in the political system and
even, through the Thirteenth Amendment (abolishing slavery) and the
Eighteenth Amendment (prohibiting alcoholic beverages), in society. The
Civil War Amendments, for example, were not passed in order to encap-
sulate a status quo and protect it against future dangers; they were passed
to do away with slavery and all the vestiges of the slave system. A good
case can be made, as well, that these Amendments were also designed to
nationalize some issues of individual rights, unrelated to slavery, where
the prior system of state autonomy had proven injurious to our ancient
liberties.
But Professor Perry exaggerates the extent to which most of the Consti-
tution can be understood as expressing a "transformative" ideal. He says
the "least controversial examples" of aspirational provisions "are probably
the first amendment, signifying the tradition's aspirations to the freedoms
of speech, press, and religion; the fifth amendment, signifying the aspira-
tion to due process of law; and the fourteenth amendment, signifying the
aspirations to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws." '121 I
think he is probably right about equal protection; as to the rest, they are
better understood as bulwarks against change rather than aspirations to
further change. They are limitations on the coercive power of the state.
They do not reflect any "aspiration" toward social transformation.
As Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. commented in a speech that is
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quoted at least six times in Morality, Politics and Law, "It is the very
purpose of our Constitution-and particularly of the Bill of Rights-to
declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary politi-
cal majorities." '22 Under this vision, the Constitution is intended to pre-
vent "temporary political majorities" from violating the traditional free-
doms of our political system. The Constitution is not, for the most part, to
be the catalyst of change. That is the task of legislation. Ample powers to
pass laws for the public good have been vested in state legislatures and
(within certain enumerated areas) in Congress. These powers are to be
used to promote evolving notions of the good society. The Constitution
and the power of judicial review, by contrast, exist to ensure that our
elected officials do not step beyond the limits prescribed for them.
This philosophy is most evident in the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments: neither the states nor the federal govern-
ment may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." This is plainly and unmistakably a protection of the sta-
tus quo. No one shall be deprived. No government shall take away what
any person has (without due process of law). If the government wishes to
alter the preexisting distribution of life, liberty, or property, it must com-
ply with the proper forms and procedures. The scheme of democratic gov-
ernance, separation of powers, and checks and balances, which makes up
the bulk of the constitutional text, defines those forms and procedures, and
is designed to retard change and to subject it to the discipline of popular
accountability. The constitutional system is "deliberative," to be sure, but
hardly "transformative" (except in its democratic aspects).
Nor can the protections for free speech, press, and religion in the First
Amendment reasonably be thought to express "transformative" aspira-
tions. The people had just established a new central government. They
feared that the new government might invade the precious liberties they
exercised under their own state constitutions. They insisted, as a condition
of forming the Union, that the new federal government be prevented from
invading those liberties. This was a profoundly conservative impulse. The
historical context precludes any possibility that the First Amendment is a
"transformative" principle. (To some extent, "incorporation" of the First
Amendment against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment has a
"transformative" element, but not much. The people of 1789 did not
devote their attention to innovative liberties when they insisted upon a Bill
of Rights; they protected the most fundamental liberties they enjoyed in
their states at the time. That those liberties have now been "incorporated"
against the states means, at most, that federal courts rather than state
122. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L.
REv. 433, 436 (1986).
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courts will define in particular cases what the contours of the liberties will
be.)
The use of the term "aspirations". (in lieu of laws, provisions, princi-
ples, requirements, or limitations) thus serves to create a subtle misappre-
hension about the respective roles of constitutional law and democratic
politics under our system. With the significant exception of portions of the
Civil War Amendments, already noted, constitutional law protects ex-
isting liberties and entitlements. With respect to some of those entitle-
ments (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so on) the protections
are absolute, in the sense that they may not be taken away by legislative
action. With respect to other entitlements (unenumerated aspects of life,
liberty, and property), the protections are provisional; to take them away
requires enactment of legislation and execution through proper proce-
dures. The Constitution thus slows the process of social change, but it
does not prevent it. Decisions about the pace and direction of social
change are, by and large, left to representative politics.
VI. ON THE PROPHETIC FUNCTION OF JUDGES
Professor Perry argues frankly that the "deliberative, transformative
politics" for which he yearns finds its fullest expression in constitutional
adjudication. Not that "the persons who occupy the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government aren't also capable of moral leadership." But
his "argument is simply that because of its political insularity, the federal
judiciary is institutionally advantaged in dealing with controversial politi-
cal-moral issues." '23 This preference for courts over representative institu-
tions is the only basis for his claim that nonoriginalism is superior to
originalism.
One might note that it is not always true, as Perry assumes, that the
"aspirational" meaning gives greater scope to judicial governance and less
to representative institutions than does the original meaning. 24 The Com-
merce Clause as originally understood and intended, for example, con-
stricted Congress's power within fairly narrow limits; but its broader, "as-
pirational," meaning... may be closer to the current rule: Congress has
the power to regulate anything vaguely related to economics. Enforcing
the original meaning would keep the federal courts very busy, and enable
them to smuggle in large doses of their political-moral insight in the guise
of policing the boundaries of Congress's commerce power.
Perry has evidently conflated originalism and the doctrine of judicial
123. P. 147.
124. See pp. 167-68 (equating nonoriginalism with "larger" judicial role and originalism with
"smaller").
125. This presupposes that "aspirational" meaning is based on popular consensus, in this case
from the New Deal to the present. As noted above, the concept is not dearly defined. See supra text
accompanying notes 92-94.
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restraint. But this is not a serious error. In most respects, the two ap-
proaches are compatible. On the whole, originalist judges will have fewer
opportunities for exercising moral-political discretion, since the range of
constitutional meaning will be somewhat less indeterminate. Moreover,
originalism will produce more constrained judges because the Constitu-
tion, as originally understood, envisioned a somewhat smaller role for the
courts than they now exercise.
In any event, Perry's argument for nonoriginalism is that as moral-
political decisionmakers judges are superior to elected officials. It is their
very lack of political accountability-their "political insularity"-that
makes judges superior decisionmakers."2 ' For many members of "the
electorally accountable branches of government," after all, "the cardinal
value is 'incumbency' "-they want to be reelected.12 To his credit, Perry
does not shrink from the anti-democratic implications of his argument. He
admits that "[t]he originalist role is a better way of keeping faith" with
"the tradition's aspiration to electorally accountable government."'' 28 But
he is willing to sacrifice the democratic aspect of self-government for an
improved "mediation of the past of the tradition with its present," which
he believes will promote "justice"-a term he leaves undefined.'2  He
does not take refuge in the notion that the people somehow, somewhere
"intended" the outcomes of nonoriginalist decisions. The argument from
consent of the governed was necessarily abandoned when originalism was
abandoned.
Even under Perry's nonoriginalist argument, there is nothing unique
about judges themselves that places them "in an institutionally advantaged
position to play a prophetic role."1 30 It is not their training in law school;
prophecy is not in the curriculum. Any other elite institution, insulated
from popular accountability, would serve as well as the judiciary. All that
matters is that the decisionmakers not be responsive to popular opinion.
What we are looking for is an aristocracy (not in the sense of a hereditary
nobility, but in the Aristotelian sense of rule by the best). It just so hap-
pens that in the United States, the Supreme Court (under the tutelage of
the bar and the academy) is the closest thing to an aristocracy that we
have available. To attempt to create a new institution for moral-political
decisionmaking would be impossible.
126. Perry also argues that "an eminently sensible division of labor.., helps justify the judicial
role in question," since the representative branches lack the "time and resources" to deal with the
many "individual rights cases" that fill the courts' dockets. P. 148. But this is a makeweight argument
at best. It supports the judicial role of deciding cases, but does not support nonoriginalism over
originalism. The question is whether the courts will enforce the general principles established by the
legislature, if consistent with the Constitution as originally understood, or substitute their own. It
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It is difficult to argue with the proposition that a form of government in
which the only participants are highly educated citizens trained in the arts
of persuasion (lawyers) has some advantages over mass democracy, and
even over the representative democracy bequeathed to us by the framers
and ratifiers. And it is difficult to dispute the fact that on some issues,
racial discrimination notably among them, the Supreme Court responded
more rapidly to the moral imperative than did the representative
branches.131 But I would nonetheless pose some practical objections to rule
by federal judges, which should be considered in addition to the obvious
arguments from principle.1 3 2
First, the most notable successes of the federal judiciary have been their
faithful enforcement of constitutional provisions as originally understood,
even under adverse political circumstances. This is not surprising, since
the Constitution, faithfully interpreted, includes most of the provisions a
reasonable person, steeped in our liberal political tradition, would want to
see. Among these have been Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer133
(affirming that individual rights may not be invaded without legislative
sanction); Brown v. Board of Education"" (affirming that de jure racial
segregation is a denial of equal protection); the free speech cases, culmi-
nating in Brandenburg v. Ohio;"35 the school prayer cases; 36 and INS v.
Chadha1 37 (affirming that Congress must follow constitutionally-pre-
scribed procedures if it wishes to issue directives with the force and effect
of law).1 38 All of these decisions were "activist" in the sense of striking
down actions of the political branches, sometimes quite entrenched. But
all of them were based on principles traceable to the Constitution as origi-
nally understood. (That the latter assertion is controversial is only proof
that the originalist method leaves ample scope for judgment and disagree-
ment.) 39 And to these might be added decisions, like the reapportionment
and poll tax cases, that reached the right result but on the wrong constitu-
tional theory.140
131. If one ignores Dred Scott and Plessy. Third time's a charm.
132. My purpose here is only to introduce practical points not considered in Morality, Politics,
and Law. The practical disadvantages of greater judicial discretion should be evaluated in comparison
to the alternatives, an analysis I do not undertake here. For a comparative perspective, see McCon-
nell, supra note 118, at 105-07.
133. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
136. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
137. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
138. This list is intended to be suggestive, not comprehensive. In particular, it neglects the Court's
nonconstitutional decisions, which make up the bulk of its work.
139. See Brest, supra note 47, at 237 ("moderate originalism and nonoriginalism so often produce
identical results").
140. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and the
subsequent reapportionment cases would have been better decided under the republican form of gov-
ernment clause, art. IV, § 4, and Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
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Many of the other popular successes of the Court have been cases in
which it strikes down laws that are unpopular, unenforced, and would be
repealed if they were not ignored. It is no accident that defenders of mod-
ern jurisprudence in the Bork hearings concentrated on decisions like
Griswold v. Connecticut,"4 a challenge to an antiquated law that had not
been enforced for a generation. In these cases, a nonoriginalist approach
does no damage to democratic governance; but it also accomplishes virtu-
ally nothing of practical importance. The right to use birth control had
already been won in the popular arena, years before the Supreme Court
made it official."42
The work left to be done by nonoriginalism is the creation of "rights"
never contemplated by the framers and ratifiers and too controversial to be
passed by the various legislatures. Surely some of these rights (to work for
more than 10 hours a day or for less than a minimum wage, to abort a
child, to show a sexually explicit movie in view of an expressway, and
others) could have used a bit more deliberation, which they would have
received in the political process if the courts had not put an end to it.
Second, contrary to Professor Perry's romantic vision, judicial decision-
making contains very little serious deliberation on moral issues.1 4 In the
abortion decision, for example, the Court majority thought it "need not
resolve" the moral-legal status of the unborn child (thereby deciding it by
default), 144 while the dissenters devoted their entire opinion to issues of
standing to sue and the power of the states. Of course, standing and state
power are important legal issues, but surely the overriding moral-political
question was how the political community goes about determining to
whom it will extend the protection of the law. Bowers v. Hardwick,45
which dealt with state power to regulate private consensual sexual con-
duct, presented an unedifying face-off between a majority that believed the
claims of homosexuals to sexual autonomy were "at best, facetious,"'
14
and dissenters who reflexively equated long-standing religious moral
teaching with "religious intolerance," without pausing to reflect on its
possible moral underpinnings.147 It may sound extreme, but I think the
ought to have been decided under the Fifteenth Amendment.
141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
142. In other cases, of which the state action cases of the 1960's and the gender discrimination
cases of the 1970's are examples, the Court has been one step ahead of the political process. This has
speeded progress, but not without cost. For example, by striking down forms of discrimination against
women that had little persuasive justification, the Court deprived supporters of the Equal Rights
Amendment of their strongest arguments and may have contributed the margin of defeat.
143. See Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5 CONsT. COMM.
375, 386-87 (1988).
144. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
145. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
146. Id. at 194.
147. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Contrast the opinion by the same author in Roe, 410
U.S. at 160 (citing Jewish, Protestant, and pre-nineteenth century Roman Catholic teachings on abor-
tion in support of his conclusion).
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discussion of gay rights in and around the Chicago City Council had more
substance than the opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick. The Court's treat-
ment of other prominent moral-constitutional questions (affirmative ac-
tion, parochial school aid, children's rights, educational funding, capital
punishment, pornography, property rights, and others) has not been much
better. The Court's analysis is typically long on manipulation of precedent
and low on intelligible principle.
Nor, I believe, has there been much more moral deliberation behind the
curtains. The Justices are far too busy to spend much time thinking about
the cases, and their conferences are largely perfunctory. Certainly they
have no time to do the kind of outside reading they would need to become
able to contribute to moral-political deliberation in a serious way. In con-
trast to the months, even years, that are devoted to major legislative delib-
eration, the Justices devote one hour to oral argument and somewhat less
than that to discussion at conference. Amazingly, they do not even wait to
see what the dissenting opinion has to say before joining the majority. The
appearance of debate and deliberation created by the opinions is largely a
sham.
Third, not only do Supreme Court opinions contain little serious moral
reflection, but they serve as an excuse for dispensing with moral reflection
at other levels of government. Supporters of a right to abortion do not
have to engage in a serious discussion of their position in the state legisla-
tures; as Perry observes, " " all they need do is cite Roe v. Wade." 9 The
silence has broken in recent months, but only because many now believe
the Court may withdraw from some applications of Roe and return deci-
sionmaking authority to the states. When a candidate for President is crit-
icized for vetoing flag salute legislation, he hides behind an advisory opin-
ion from a court rather than explaining why he was right (if he was).
When federal communications regulators revoke the "Fairness Doctrine"
on the ground that it interferes with freedom of speech they are criticized
for not waiting for the Supreme Court. Constitutional adjudication is not
a supplement to moral-political deliberation; it is often a substitute.
Fourth, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a preference for judi-
cial rule contains a large element of class bias. Judges, as well as most of
the lawyers who appear before them and the academics who comment on
their work, are members of the upper-middle-class. They come from a
highly educated sector of society. This class typically has a particular pre-
disposition toward moral issues. By contrast, legislators have to listen to,
and accommodate, the opinions of a broader segment of society. The one
clear effect of nonoriginalism is to give upper middle class opinions a dis-
proportionate role in public decisionmaking. Some may contend that up-
148. P. 177.
149. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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per middle class values are objectively the best; I suspect this is the real
reason why nonoriginalism is so popular among academics.15 But these
arguments are rarely made in public.
Fifth, if it becomes acceptable for judges to decide cases in light of their
own moral beliefs, the appointment-confirmation process will give us a
different sort of Justice. The system has worked reasonably well up to
now, mostly because the large part of the judicial function has been tradi-
tional legal interpretation, and judges could be selected accordingly. Al-
ready, in the Bork controversy, we have caught a glimpse of the future.
Democracy will not tolerate an aristocracy. If judges assume powers of a
legislative nature, we must expect the selection of judges to descend to the
level of sound-bite, litmus test, character assassination, media blitz, issue
simplification, celebrity endorsement, platitude, and distortion that we
know and love in the electoral arena. We may not gain an aristocracy; we
may lose an independent judiciary.
Sixth, judicial errors are more difficult to correct than political errors.
For solid institutional reasons, courts are reluctant to overrule precedents,
especially recent precedents."' Political response to judicial error is slow
and difficult, if not impossible.
Most fundamentally, however, rule by judges is objectionable in this
society because it is inconsistent with the principles of self-government.
The tradition of this political community cannot accept the proposition
that the elite make better decisions than the people, or that popular insti-
tutions are inferior to electorally unaccountable ones. The cure to republi-
can diseases must themselves be republican. As a result, nonoriginalist
decisionmaking has generally survived outside the academy by cloaking
itself in a source of authority more persuasive than the judge's own moral
beliefs, usually some combination of spurious original intent, precedent,
and a pretense that the judge is doing no more than enforcing "the Con-
stitution." '52 When is the last time the Supreme Court explained a deci-
sion on the ground that it reflected "the Justice's own beliefs about the
aspirations of the American tradition"? If Professor Perry is serious, he
ought to urge the Court to do just that. Then we would be able to deter-
mine whether, as he claims, his approach is consistent with the American
moral-political tradition.
150. Professor Perry displays a surprising deference to the moral opinions of establishment orga-
nizations such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association, stating that a
judicial decision following their lead would be immune to the charge of being "imperial." P. 177.
151. See Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1983).
152. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973) (if some believe the Court's parochial
school aid decisions have had unfair and paradoxical results, "the 'fault' lies not with the doctrines
which are said to create a paradox but rather with the Establishment Clause itself").
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VII. ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
If the "strengths of the nonoriginalist theory of judicial role" consist
solely in the superior institutional position of judges, it is odd that Profes-
sor Perry does not more forthrightly declaim the virtues of unbridled judi-
cial activism. But he does not. Rather, he argues that "[a] theory of judi-
cial self-restraint or self-limitation can and should be an important
component of nonoriginalism."' 53 In particular, the judge should "hesi-
tate" to invalidate policy choices that are the product of "deliberation,"
waiting until she is "confident of her position that the policy choice is
ruled out by the relevant aspiration(s)."'154 Moreover, the judge should
defer to representative institutions where "proper" resolution of the issue
is "relatively unimportant," or where judicial activism would "threaten[]
to precipitate a societal crisis and perhaps even impair the Court's capac-
ity to function effectively. 1 55
Like Perry's pragmatic arguments for sparing use of government coer-
cion, these arguments for judicial restraint are sound and persuasive
(though only in the context of nonoriginalist interpretation) . 5  But also
like those arguments, they depend on a highly case-specific form of self-
restraint, rather than on a more defined understanding of institutional
boundaries. Just as Perry's liberalism is contingent, his judicial restraint
is contingent. It is not based on the view that politically accountable insti-
tutions are the legitimate decisionmakers, but on the realization that it is
sometimes prudent to let them act as if they were-in cases of substantial
doubt, of trivial importance, or of danger to the courts' institutional
position.
Nonetheless, like Perry's liberalism, his commitment to judicial re-
straint is real. Virtually alone among nonoriginalist academics, Perry be-
lieves that (with relatively minor exceptions) state legislatures should be
free to decide whether to permit abortions. 5 ' This is the acid test. Some-
times it seems that the holy grail of modern constitutional theorizing is to
find an explanation that might justify the result in Roe v. Wade. Perry,
however, argues that the Roe decision is "plainly imperial." He states, "I
strongly doubt that sensitive application of the constitutional principle of




156. If the Constitution, properly interpreted, clearly indicates that a practice of the government is
unconstitutional, and if the case is properly within the court's jurisdiction, a judge would be derelict in
his duty if he voted to sustain it. Misplaced judicial restraint can be a disaster. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) (postponing enforcement of desegregation decree for
fear of social consequences).
157. This statement may seem to neglect John Hart Ely, whose criticism of Roe is well known.
See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 1 am not
sure that Ely's structural approach to constitutional law is not a variant of originalism; but even if it
is not, he is the rare exception.
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previability abortions of any sort. Such a conclusion seems to me to re-
quire a premise-that the protection of fetal life is not a good of sufficient
importance-obviously not entailed by that principle." '158
Perry argues that, instead of creating an abortion right, the Court
should have struck down the Texas law in Roe on the narrow, and cura-
ble, ground that it did not allow for certain exceptions (significant threat
to physical health of the mother, rape or incest, genetically defective child
whose life would be "short and painful"). The effect of such a decision, he
says, would be to instigate debate in the various states over the moral
issues involved. Roe, by contrast, attempted "to preempt discourse about
that question." '159 This alternative course of action (which resembles the
Court's treatment of capital punishment and pornography), would have
been preferable, according to Perry, "not simply because that would have
been the more 'democratic' thing to do, but also, and more fundamentally,
because the Court, like the rest of us, might have learned something useful
from the ensuing discourse. 1
6 0
I agree with Perry that this would have produced more serious deliber-
ation over the moral issue of abortion than the course the Court adopted. I
also believe, as he does not say, that representative bodies are institution-
ally better able to reach solutions to contentious issues of this sort-partly
because they can adopt an "unprincipled" compromise position, 61 and
partly because the right of political participation will make the losers in
the conflict better able to accept the result. The actual decision in Roe
seems the worst of all possible worlds: a decision that resolves the key
moral question by purporting not to do so, that cuts off deliberation and
debate, that makes compromise impossible, and that eliminates political
solutions and thereby drives opponents of the decision to non-political "di-
rect action.11 6
2
Where I disagree with Perry is in his specific prescription for the case
(to strike down the Texas statute for failure to provide the three excep-
tions). I have three objections. First, it was unnecessary. At the time of
Roe, there was already great legislative ferment on the issue of abortion;
five states had already passed permissive abortion laws and others would
158. P. 175. This represents a change in Perry's thinking since 1976. See Perry, Abortion, the
Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976).
159. P. 177.
160. P. 177.
161. Some say that it is impossible to compromise a clear-cut, life-and-death issue like abortion.
This is manifestly untrue, as experience in other Western countries demonstrates. See M. GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 13-24 (1987). There are any number of intermediate
positions which, unlike the current rule of abortion on demand and unlike the pure pro-life position,
could command substantial majority support.
162. See 1,000 Arrested in Blockades of Abortion Clinics, L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, at 1, col. 4
(over 7,000 individuals arrested in non-violent protests at abortion clinics during four-month period in
1988).
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have followed suit. Judicial intervention was not necessary to "insure that
the various considerations against criminalizing previability abortions...
were given due consideration in the legislative process." '63 It was already
happening. Second, the three exceptions, however closely they may track
popular sentiments, 6 ' are unprincipled. While they would be unexcep-
tionable as the product of legislative processes, they have no basis in con-
stitutional law. Third, the suggested disposition violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication, particularly the doctrines of overbreadth and
severability. The plaintiff in Roe did not fall within any of the exceptions
Perry would recognize. Since the abortion statute was constitutional as to
her, she had no right to seek its invalidation as it might be applied in
other cases. However sensible Perry's approach might seem in this partic-
ular case, the Court should not make up new procedural rules for abor-
tion cases.
In short, Professor Perry's contingent judicial restraint is superior to
the Roe Court's dogmatic activism, but traditional jurisprudence would
have been better yet.
VIII. ON MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW
The overall message of Morality, Politics, and Law might be said to be
that the categories of "morality," "politics," and "law" are indistinguish-
able and interchangeable. Politics cannot be severed from morality, 6 5 and
law-the process of adjudication-is a "species" of "politics."1 6 But after
playing a prominent role in the fourth chapter (on legislation) and the
fifth chapter (on obedience and disobedience), the concept of "law" almost
drops out of the section where it would seem to be most central: the sec-
tion on legal interpretation.
In setting up his discussion of constitutional adjudication, Professor
Perry puts the question this way: "On what moral beliefs ought a person
to rely, in her capacity as judge, in deciding whether public policy regard-
ing some matter is constitutionally valid?'1167 Is this not a peculiar way to
phrase the question? Does it not invite the simple answer: the judge must
rely on those "moral beliefs" that ihave been embodied in a law?
It is no easy matter to figure out what principles have been embodied in
the Constitution (or any other law) and how to apply those principles to
the case at hand. But at least it helps to know that "moral beliefs" other
than those embodied in law are irrelevant to the decision of the case. This
includes the moral beliefs of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
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jority of the American people (to the extent they have not been enacted
into law), and the moral beliefs of the judge (to the extent they have not
been incorporated by reference into law).
But this is not Perry's answer. The concept of "law" does not intrude
into his discussion of what "moral beliefs" should be enforced by the
courts, apparently because it does not matter whether any set of moral
principles has in fact been adopted by the American people through the
procedures our nation recognizes as necessary for the enactment of "law."
Good moral beliefs will do. The effect is to distract attention from the
principal question addressed by our Constitution-the allocation, diffu-
sion, and limitation of power. Perry's terminology makes it unnecessary
for the judge to ask the key question-the only question-entrusted to the
judge engaged in constitutional judicial review: whether the decision under
challenge was made in the constitutionally prescribed manner by officials
vested with constitutional authority to make it.
Perry thus disregards the very element that distinguishes "morality"
from "law," and "politics" from both. The difference does not lie in the
subject matter. It lies in the institutional setting. "Morality" is diffuse and
decentralized; in a pluralistic society there is no single private authority
with a right to determine morality for everyone else. "Politics" is the pro-
cess we use to determine which of the various moral principles held by the
people command (and should command) sufficient support to become en-
forceable through the coercive power of the state. "Law" is the end result
of politics (including the constitutional politics of drafting, ratifying, and
amending the Constitution). It is the process of applying those moral
principles so adopted to a particular case.
In any society there are reasons to insist that politics and law be con-
ducted by different institutions and different persons. The power both to
make the rules and to apply them is so potent a combination that it is
safer to divide them, at least to the extent it is possible (some interstitial
lawmaking by the executive and judicial branches is unavoidable). But in
a democratic society, the distinction between morality, politics, and law is
especially important. Our constitutional structure guarantees that we, the
people, will have a role in deciding which moral principles will be author-
itative. We have made our politics a democratic politics. If those with
power to determine what the law is simply cast about for the best, most
persuasive moral principles (to them), then the people's role in the process
is eliminated. If he is to be consistent, Perry cannot claim that the institu-
tional advantage of the courts as moral-political decisionmakers is their
insulation from popular opinion, and at the same time assert that adjudi-
cation is a species of democratic politics.
Professor Perry takes the position that in determining what application
to give to the Constitution and its "aspirations," the "judge should rely on
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her own beliefs."168 But this is to say judges should decide cases on the
basis of "morality" (their own)-not "law." It is to cut "polit-
ics"-democratic politics-out of the picture. I do not believe Professor
Perry has made his case that this is the better way to interpret the Consti-
tution, and certainly not that his rejection of liberal republicanism faith-
fully represents the aspirations of the American political tradition.
168. P. 149 (emphasis in original).
1989] 1543

